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CONGRESS, THE PRESIDENT,
AND THE SEPARATION
OF POWERS:
R.ErrHINKING THE VALUE
OF LITIGATION
Jonathan L. Entin*

T

he term "separation of powers" appears nowhere in the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the division of federal authority among three distinct but
interdependent branches is one of the defining features of the American
governmental system. Designed to promote both liberty and efficiency, this
structure affords ample opportunity for interbranch conflict. Consistent with
Tocqueville's famous observation that "[s]carcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a judicial
guestion," 1 the Supreme Court recently has addressed an unusually large
number of disputes concerning the respective powers of Congress and the
President. 2 This has occurred even though the New Deal apparently had
transformed the seemingly arcane subject of separation of powers into a
topic of primarily antiquarian interest. 3
The renewed attention to the problem of government structure was largely
stimulated by three cases that arose from the Watergate affair. The first,

Copyright© 1990 by Jonathan L. Entin.
*Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University. This is a revised and
abridged version of a longer article, Separation of Powers, the Political Branches, and the Limits
ofjudicial Review, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 175 (1990).
1
] A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 290 (P. Bradley ed. 1945).
2 The relationship between Congress and the President has not been the only aspect of
government structure that has occupied the Court's attention during this period. Two other
problems also have generated significant litigation. The first relates to the constitutionality
of assigning the power to adjudicate legal claims to tribunals whose members lack the tenure
and salary protections enjoyed by article III judges. CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986);
Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). Another line of cases adqresses the
problem of federalism and the role of the states in our constitutional system. E.g., National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled, Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
'See Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, l 01 HARV. L. REV. 421, 437-52 (1987).
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United States v. Nixon;' upheld the validity of a subpoena for tape recordings
of presidential conversations relating to the illegal entry into the headquarters of the Democratic National Committee, a ruling that led ineluctably to
Mr. Nixon's resignation from office two weeks later. The next case, Buckley
v. llaleo, 5 held unconstitutional the process for selecting members of the
Federal Election Commission, an agency created as part of the statutory
reforms passed in the wake of perceived fund-raising abuses in President
Nixon's 1972 reelection campaign. The third, Nixon v. Administrator of General SeYvices, 6 rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of a statute depriving Mr. Nixon of control over his presidential papers.
Increasing1y frequent separation of pov.rers litigation has not been simply
an artifact of Watergate, however. 1nterbranch conflicts occupied a central
place on the Court's docket during the 1 980s. Among the more notable
cases were INS v. Chadha,; which invalidated the legislative veto; Bowsher l'.
Synar, 8 which struck down the central feature of the original Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Act; and Mon-ison v. Olson, 9 which upheld the independent
counsel provisions of the Ethics in Government Act. 10
This line of cases has left us in an unsatisfactory position. The Court has
failed to articulate a consistent methodology for analyzing separation of
powers disputes involving Lhe legislative and executive branches. Sometimes
it follows a formal approach analogous to the " 'strict' in theory and fatal

'418 u.s. 583 (1974).
'424 U.S. ] (1975) (per curiam).
''433 u.s. 425 (1977).
'452 U.S. 919 (1983); accord Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. FTC, 591 F.2d 575 (D.C.
Cir. 1982) (en bane) (per curiam), ajfd mem. sub nom. United States Senate v. FTC, 453 U.S.
1215 (1983); Consumer Energy Council of Am. v. FERC, 573 F.2d 425 (D.C. Cir. 1982),
ajfd mem. sub nom. Process Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 453
u.s. 1215 (1983).
8
478 u.s. 714 (1985).
9 487 u.s. 554 (1 988).
'"The Court also decided some less publicized separation of powers cases during this
period. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989) (upholding user fees
imposed upon pipeline operators by Secretary of Transportation); Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 351 (1989) (upholding validity of sentencing guidelines promulgated by United
States Sentencing Commission).
These decisions represent only .the. tip ?f the iceberg. J~u.mero;:s Jo;:;~ cou;:t ca.ses ~so
addresserl challenges to the constnuuonahty of federa] acuvJites. r...g.J .JJ:.\..._, v. nhnaer, I"<obinson & Co., 855 F.2d 577, 581-82 (lOth Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1033 (1989);
Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Ameron, Inc. v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 881-87 (3d Cir. 1985), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir.
1985), cal. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); American Fed'n of Gov't Employees v. Pierce,
597 F.2d 303,305-05 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (per curiam); Friedlander v. United States Postal Serv.,
558 F. Supp. 95, 99-102 (D.D.C. 1987). A rough statistical survey recently found a marked
increase in the number of federal cases since 1950 in which the court discussed the concept
of separation of powers, an increase that persisted even with modest controls for growth in
the size and output of the judiciary. Miller, From Compromise to Confrontation: Sepamtion of
Powers in the Reagan Era, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 40 l. 402-04 ( 1989).
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in fact" scrutiny in equal protection cases. 11 On other occasions the Court
uses a more functional approach focusing upon checks and balances. During
the 1980s, the selection of the analytical method determined the outcome
of every legislative-executive controversy. The inconsistencies in outcomes
and methodology are hardly unique to separation of powers problems, 12 but
they suggest the need for greater analytical clarity than the Court thus far
has demonstrated.
At a more fundamental level, the quest for ultimate judicial resolution of
constitutional turf battles between Congress and the President has undesirable consequences for the nation as a whole. Separation of powers disputes
implicate fundamental questions respecting the role of government, questions that rarely receive detailed attention in Supreme Court opinions. Excessive reliance upon the Court deceives us into thinking that these disputes
are purely constitutional in nature and that only the Justices can resolve
them. Demanding judicial resolution improperly diminishes the role of the
political branches in interpreting the Constitution; emphasizing the constitutionality of a proposal diverts attention from its often dubious wisdom.
The limited utility of judicial review in legislative-executive conflicts has
been demonstrated numerous times. For example, the courts played no role
in the controversy over the Tenure of Office Act, 13 probably the most severe
separation of powers problem in our history. Indeed, congressional concerns about the constitutionality of that statute contributed to the acquittal
of Andrew Johnson in the only presidential impeachment trial ever conducted by the Senate. 14 The Act was amended in 1869 during the first weeks
ofthe Grant administration and repealed, after perfunctory debate, in 1887
by a Congress which recognized the unfortunate experiment as the great
national embarrassment that it was. 15
Similarly, the judiciary has served as a bystander throughout the controversy over the War Powers Resolution. 15 Congress passed that measure in
1973 to prevent a repetition of what was widely regarded as the unilateral
''Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Fore-.vord: In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. I, 8 (1972).
12
A notable illustration in a more contentious area involves the display of religious symbols
on public property. Compare Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) (allowing creche with
secular decorations) with County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (disallowing
unadorned creche but permitting menorah).
"Ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430 (1867),amended by Act of Apr. 5,1869, ch. 10, 16 Stat. 6, repealed
by Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 353, 24 Stat. 500. The Supreme Court retroactively condemned
the Act as unconstitutional approximately forty years after its repeal. Myers v. United States,
272 u.s. 52, 176 (1926).
14 The votes of seven Republican senators, otherwise opponents of the President, were
essential to Johnson's acquittal. These senators voted to acquit at least in part out of concern
that the Tenure of Office Act violated the Constitution. E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION 336
(1988); H. TREFOUSSE, ANDREW jOHNSON 330-31 (1989).
"See Entin, The Removal Power and the Federal Deficit: Form, Substance, and Administrative
Independence, 75 KY. L.J. 699, 722-23 (1987).
'"50 u.s.c. §§ 1541-1548 (1988).
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executive commitment of American military forces to the war in Southeast
Asia. 17 No President has accepted its validity, although several have submined reports to Congress in apparent compliance with its terms. 18 At the
same time, the legislative branch has scrupulously avoided invocation of the
Resolution in every situation in which it seemed to apply, including the
Persian Gulf conflict. 19 Court rulings have neither undermined this measure
nor stimulated recent proposals to amend it. 20
Finally, Watergate itself suggests the limits of judicial review in separation
of pov~,rers disputes betv..reen the po1itical branches. P..Jthough the Supreme
Court decision in the tapes case led directly to President Nixon's resignation; the judicial pronouncement \Vas not the only factor in his departure
from office. The House judiciary Committee was conducting a simultaneous
inquiry that culminated in the voting of three articles of impeachment against
the President. While members of Congress might have preferred to await
the Court's ruling, the impeachment process by itself probably would have
led to the same denouement. 21
The emphasis upon the limited utility of judicial resolution of separation
of powers disputes between the political branches is addressed primarily to
elected officials, lawyers, and citizens. 1t suggests that less reliance upon
litigation could promote more intelligent public policymaking by creating
opportunities for reasonable accommodation of conflicting viewpoints. Following the course recommended in this article would not be a panacea. This
approach involves the creation of necessary, not sufficient, conditions for
more effective governance and politics.
At the same time, the discussion has implications for courts called upon
to resolve interbranch separation of powers disputes. Some commentators,
most notably Dean Choper, have suggested that the judiciary refrain from
"ln fact, Congress approved presidential action in the region when it passed the Tonkin
Gulf Resolution in August, 1964. H.R.J. REs. 1145, 78 Stat. 384 (1964), repealed by Act of
Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, § 12, 84 Stat. 2053, 2055. Thereafter the executive
branch asserted that the Resolution served as the functional eguivalent of a congressional
declaration of war. See, e.g., Department of State, Office of the Legal-Adviser, The Legality
of United Stales Participation in the Defense of VietNam, 75 YALE LJ. I 085, ll 02-06 (1966).
'"Sec HOUSE Coi,·lili. ON FOREIGN AFFAlRS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., THE -WAR POWERS
RESOLUTION 169-254 (Comm. Print !982) [hereinafter HOUSE STUDY]; Carter, The Constitutionality of the War Powe-rs Resolution, 70 VA. L REV. I 0 l, I 04-07 (1984); Koh, Why the
President (Almost) Always Wins in Foreign Affairs: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 97 YALE LJ
1255, 1260 & nn.l4-15 (1988); Comment, The War Powers Resolution After Fifteen Years: A
Reassessment, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 141, 160-62 (1988).

"See HousE STUDY, supra note 18, at 224, 227, 234-36, 242-43, 252-53; Ely, Suppose
Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked, 88 COLUM. L REV. 1379, 1380-81 (1988).
On occasion, the legislative and executive branches have negotiated a compromise to avoid
invocation of the Resolution. For example, a 1983 joint resolution, in contrast to the procedures specified in the War Powers Resolution, authorized the deployment of U.S. Marines
in Lebanon for up to eighteen months. Multinational Force in Lebanon, Pub. L No. 98119, 97 Stat. 805 (1983) (codified at 50 U .S.C. § 1541 note (1988)).
"See Ely, supra note 19, at 1383-85; Comment, supra note 18, at 171-73.
"'See Gunther,judicial Hegemony and Legislative Autonomy: The Nixon Case and the Impeachment Process, 22 UCLA L REv. 30 (1974).
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deciding constitutional conflicts between Congress and the President. 22 This
approach would require substantial revision of the political question
doctrine 23 and would uphold interbranch accommodations that contravened express textual provisions of the Constitution. A less extreme analysis
would defer to arrangements devised by Congress and the President provided that those arrangements were consistent with the constitutional text.
The goal would be to discourage litigation by persuading the political
branches that resort to the judicial process would rarely succeed. This in
turn might create incentives for the legislature and the executive to assess
the stakes of their disputes more realistically and to fashion workable solutions that would promote both free and responsible government.
The recommendation against reliance upon judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between Congress and the President does not
necessarily apply to other constitutional issues. The rationale for the recommendation in this context is that the legislative and executive branches
generally have ample resources with which to protect themselves. That is
not true, for example, in individual rights cases, where the party asserting
a constitutional violation frequently lacks meaningful access to the political
process as a means of self-defense. 21
I. THE ALLOCATION OF POWERS IN THE CONSTITUTION

The principle of separation of powers may be said to "define the very
character of the American political system," 25 but giving precise content to

22j. CHOPER, jUDfCIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 263 (1980); see
id. at 260-379.
25 Strauss, The Place of Agent:ies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch,
84 COLUM. L. REV. 573, 621 n.l94 (1984).
24 Analogous reasoning applies to interbranch controversies involving the federal judiciary. Many such controversies implicate concerns of individual rights. Moreover, the judicial
branch does not participate in the give-and-take of the political process as do the legislative
and executive branches.
Similarly, this rationale may not apply in federalism disputes. To be sure, the Supreme
Court has suggested that the structure of federal politics protects state interests and therefore
obviates the need for judicial enforcement of the tenth amendment. Garcia v. San Antonio
Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 547-55 (1985). Numerous critics have pointed out that
this reasoning exaggerates the extent to which the states are protected against federal encroachment. See, e.g., id. at 564-67 (Powell,]., dissenting); id. at 587-88 (O'Connor, j., dissenting); Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15-17 (1988). Even if these criticisms understate the protections that the
states enjoy in national politics, see Hero, The U.S. Congress and American Federalism: Are
'Subnational' Governments Protected?, 42 W. POL. Q. 93 (1989), it remains true that the states
do not participate directly in the federal government. By contrast, Congress and the President
are the principal actors in a broad array of federal activities.
25 G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 151 (1969).
Indeed, the principle of separation of powers was "the characteristic that distinguished our
system from all others conceived up to the time of our Constitution." Nixon v. Administrator
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 507 (1977) (Burger, C.]., dissenting).
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this principle has not proved easy. At times it has been said to prevent tyranny, at others to promote workable government. 25
The Constitutional Convention evaded the apparent conflict between liberty and efficiency by means of a novel attempt to accommodate both goals. 27
The framers established a government of separated powers assigned respectively to legislative, executive, and judicial branches. 28 In doing so, however, they"rejected the "pure doctrine" of separation of powers, under which
each branch is assigned a· unique function and may not intrude upon the
function of any other branch, 29 in favor of a more ambiguous system of
checks and balances, under which each branch was given a limited control
over the exercise of the functions of the other branches. 30 A few familiar
examples illustrate those interactions. Congress received the power to legislate, but the President was given a qualified veto over bills approved by
both the House and the Senate, which could in turn override an executive
disapproval by a supermajority vote in each chamber. 31 Similarly, the President was designated as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 32 but only
Congress could declare war. 33 The President gained the power to make
26
Compare Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (I926) (Brandeis,]., dissenting) ("The
doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power.") with Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Qackson, J., concurring in the judgment) ("While
the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice
will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.").
"In fact, as many as five different theoretical justifications for the concept of separation
of powers existed when the Constitutional Convention assembled. W. GwYN, THE MEANING
OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS !27-28 (!965). Jn addition to the rationales of efficiency,
see id. at 31-35; Banks, Efficiency in Government: Separation ofPowers Reconsidered, 35 SYRACUSE
L. REV. 7!5, 718-20, 72I-22 (1984), and liberty, see GWYN, supra, at 18-23, 40-43; M. VILE,
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 61-63 (1967), other rationales included the rule of law, see GWYN, supra, at 52-58, 71-76, I 04-13, official accountability, see
id. at 60-64, 85-87, and balancing· powers within the government, see id. at 55-56, 85-87.
28
Th is new scheme directly addressed two of the major problems of the Articles of Confederation. First, the Constitution gave the federal government explicit authority to tax and
to regulate interstate and foreign commerce. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. I, 3. Second, the
new charter created a unitary executive. !d. art. II, § I, cl. I. These features suggest that
considerations of efficiency played an important part in the drafting process.
At the same time, the federal government was given only enumerated powers. This feature
is most noticeable in the provisions dealing with the lawmaking function. Those provisions
begin by stating that "[a]lllegislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of
the United States ... ."/d. art. I,§ I. Later, Congress is explicitly granted certain authority,
id. § 8, and forbidden to undertake other actions, id. § 9. These restrictions upon central
authority suggest an effort to reduce the prospect of tyranny.
29
VILE, supra note 27, at 13-18.
'"!d. at 18. Madison explained that separation of powers, properly understood, "did not
mean that these departments ought to have no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts
of each other." THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 302 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. !961). Rather,
he contended, tyranny impended only "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department." /d. at 30203.
"U.S. CoNST. art. I,§ 7, cl. 2.
"!d. art. II, § 2, cl. I.
"!d. art. I, § 8, cl. II.
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treaties, but only with the advice and consent of a supermajority of the
Senate. 34 The President also would appoint federal officers, but the Senate
once again had to give its .advice and consent. 35
Of course, the blending of powers in the Constitution greatly enhanced
the possibilities of conflict between Congress and the President. This feature
was not accidental. The framers recognized and accepted human frailty,
most notably in Madison's famous comment that "[i]f men were angels, no
government would be necessary. " 36 They therefore established a system
designed to prevent overreaching by one branch at the expense of another
and of liberty. 37 Instead of relying upon rigid functional boundaries, 38 the
Constitution sought to provide officials of each branch with "the necessary
constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the
others." 39 To prevent overreaching, therefore, "[a]mbition must be made
to counteract ambition." 10 These ground rules would structure interbranch
conflict, and would do so in ways that increased the likelihood of beneficial
outcomes. 41
The President's qualified veto power, which already has been mentioned,
illustrates this concept. Wary of pre-Revolution abuses of the royal prerogative by the British crown, Americans hesitated to allow the President any
power to disapprove legislation. 42 Nevertheless, many supported some such
right as a means of protecting the executive from legislative encroach-

'''ld. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
35ld.
36 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 O. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). One of Madison's
coauthors added that government was instituted "[b]ecause the passions of men will not
conform to the dictates of reason and justice without constraint." THE FEDERALIST No. 15,
at 11 0 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961 ).
"D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 137-38 (1984); M. WHITE,
PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND THE CONSTITUTION 97-98 (1987).
38 The framers rejected the definitional approach because they viewed it as unworkable.
As Madison explained:
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet been able
to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great provinces-the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or even the privileges and powers of the different
legislative branches. Questions daily occur in the course of practice which prove the
obscurity which reigns in these subjects, and which puzzle the greatest adepts in political
science.
THE FEDERALIST No. 37, at 228 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). See also EPSTEIN, supra
note 37, at 127; WHITE, supra note 37, at 103.
39 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 36, at 321-22.
40ld. at 322. It bears emphasis that "ambition" in this context does not imply that officials
necessarily act with corrupt purposes when they seek excessive powers. WHITE, supra note
37,at98.
"H. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 61 (1981); j. TULIS, THE
RHETORICAL PRESIDENCY 43-44, 45 (1987).
42 L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT 141
(1985); R. SPITZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL VETO 8-12, 21-22 (1988).
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ment.·13 Because the President might refrain from exercising an absolute
veto for fear of being labeled a despot;H the framers provided for a qualified
presidential negative that would give Congress an opportunity to reconsider
and give effect to a vetoed proposal if it attracted an unusually large measure
of support. This seemingly less extreme authority, they reasoned, was simultaneously more likely to be used and less likely to offend, and therefore
would serve as a potent weapon in the new government. 45
Strikingly absent from these discussions of the benefits of interbranch
political conflict as a mechanism for pron1oting effective, non tyrannical government is any mention of the judiciary as umpire of constitutional disputes
bett.veen Congress and the President. 46 That absence is not dispositive. After
all, the Constitution does not expressly provide for judicial review, an institution dating to the earliest years of the RepublicY Nevertheless, the structure of the Constitution and the traditional arguments supporting judicial
review suggest a comparatively modest role for the courts in resolving separation of powers disputes between the political branches. Unlike the claimants in individual rights and perhaps also federalism disputes, 48 Congress
and the President possess ample political resources with which to protect
their interests. For this reason, and because the legislature and the chief
executive aiso have the practical wisdom to determine for themselves the
stakes of any particular controversy, courts should hesitate to insist upon
comprehensive resolution of constitutional turf battles between the political
branches. More important, the political branches themselves and the citizenry at large should hesitate to seek judicial resolution of these issues.
II. THE DIFFlCUL TY OF RECONCILING THE CASES
The recent Supreme Court decisions addressing separation of powers disputes between the legislative and executive branches have employed dis"Without some veto power, absolute or qualified, the President "might gradually be
stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions or annihilated by a single vote. And in
the one mode or the other, the legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be
blended in the same hands." THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 442 (A. Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed.
1961 ). Even some uppunems of the Constitution accepted this reasoning. SPITZER, supm note
42, at 21; STORING, supra note 41, at 61.
.,.,An absolute veto might be used too readily in "extraordinary" circumstances, thereby
increasing the risk of executive aggrandizement or presidential tyranny. See THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, supra note 36, at 323; SPITZER, supra note 42, at 12.
"TilE FEDERALIST No. 73, supra note 43, at 444-46; SPITZER, supra note 42, at 17-20.
·HiEPSTEIN,

supra

nole

37,

at

140.

·"This article focuses upon the utility rather than the legitimacy of judicial review of
separation of powers disputes between the legislative and executive branches of the federal
government. The legitimacy of judicial review as a general proposition is beyond the scope
of the present discussion. The literature on that topic is so large that a disinterested observer
"might well conclude that today this is not just the first but the only issue on the agenda of
constitutional scholars." Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV.
1331, 1331 ( 1988). Suffice it to say that supporters of the Constitution argued that the courts
would have the power to invalidate legislation. E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 466-69 (A.
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter eel. 1961).
"See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
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tinctive analytical techniques. At times, the Court has applied a strictly formal
approach emphasizing the essential separateness of the branches and underscoring the importance of allowing each to function as master in its own
sphere. At others, the Court has followed a more pragmatic course, focusing
upon the existence of checks and balances to prevent the accumulation of
unopposed authority that could lead to arbitrary action by a single branch.
The analytical scheme selected determined the outcome of every case decided during the 1980s. 49 Despite the existence of parallel lines of cases, the
Court has failed almost completely even to acknowledge its contrasting
methodologies in separation of powers disputes, much less explain how or
why it chose which methodology in any particular case. 50
Several recent decisions have suggested that the key to understanding the
differing outcomes is whether one branch has sought to aggrandize its power
at the expense of another. 51 Unfortunately, the aggrandizement-nonaggrandizement distinction is difficult to apply coherently. Any measure that
reallocates authority from one branch to another can be said both to increase the power of the branch which gains new authority and to diminish
the power of the branch which loses authority that it previously possessed. 52
Consider, for example, Bowsher v. Synar 53 and CFTC v. Schor, 54 which were
decided on the same day. Bowsher applied formalist reasoning to invalidate
an arrangement under which an official supposedly subservient to Congress
was given authority to impose spending reductions that otherwise would
49 For applications offormalism, see Bowsher v. Synar, 4 78 U.S. 714 (1986); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983). For applications of the checks-and-balances approach, see Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989); Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
The sole exception to this pattern was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120-41 (1976) (per
curiam), in which the Court endorsed a relatively pragmatic approach to separation of powers
problems but found that the method for selecting members of the Federal Election Commission violated the express terms of the appointments clause.
50
Judicial acknowledgments of analytical inconsistencies in recent separation of powers
jurisprudence appear primarily in dissenting opinions. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 725-27 (Scalia,
]., dissenting); CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 865 (1986) (Brennan,]., dissenting). Commentators who take different positions on the proper method for resolving separation of powers
disputes express equal dissatisfaction with the Court's failure to address the analytical inconsistencies in its jurisprudence in this field. See, e.g., Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102
HARV. L. REV. 105, llO, 113, 116-17 (1988) (advocating relatively formal approach to
separation of powers problems); Chemerinsky, A Paradox Without a·Principle: A Comment on
the Burger Court's jurisprudence in Separation of Powers Cases, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. I 083, 108485, 1097-1 01 ( 1987) (advocating relatively pragmatic approach to separation of powers problems).
"Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 381-83; Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693; Schor, 478 U.S. at 856-57.
52 See Blumoff, Illusions of Constitutional Decisionmaking: Politics and the Tenure Powers in the
Court, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1079, 1150-51 (1988); Krent, Separating the Strands in Separation of
Powers Controversies, 74 VA. L. REV. 1253, 1288-89 (1988); Strauss, Formal and Functional
Approaches to Separation-ofPowers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 CORNELL L. REV.
488, 517 ( 1987). Professor Krent attempts to demonstrate the point algebraically. Krent,
supra, at 1288 n.14l.
53 478 u.s. 714 (1986).
54
478 u.s. 833 (1986).
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have been directed by the President. Schor, by contrast, used a functionalist·
analysis to uphold an arrangement under which an administrative agency
was given authority to decide certain common law claims that otherwise
would have been resolved by the courts. The Court tried. to distinguish the
two cases on the ground that only Bowsher involved aggiandizement by one
branch at the expense of another. 5 5
This distinction is not persuasive. Even if Congress did not expressly usurp
judicial power in Schor, 56 it left the judiciary with a smaller proportion of
federal power than that branch otherwise would have had. By the same
token, the statute at issue in Bowsher allowed Congress, by passing a deficitreduction measure over a presidential veto, to act unilaterally. Hence, even
if one accepts the dubious assumption that the procedure for removing the
Comptroller General rendered that official subservient to the legislative
branch, 5 7 the extent of congressional aggrandizement might well have been
substantially less in Bowsher than in Schor. Nevertheless, the arrangement in
Bowsher was invalidated while that in Schor was upheld. The arrangements
approved in other recent decisions also involved reallocations of authority
comparable to that rejected in Bowsher. 58
The infirmities of the Court's approach have prompted several commentators to propose alternative reconciliations of these cases. Academic formalists have suggested that the cases turn on considerations of the
constitutional limitations upon how each branch may act. 5 9 Those adhering
to a functionalist perspective have tried to harmonize the cases with reference to a more holistic focus upon the quality and extent of interbranch
relationships that vindicate underlying structural principles of the Constitution. 50 Despite the impressive talents of their proponents, these theories
ld. at 856-57.
ln one sense, Congress did arrogate power to itself by conferring the adjudicatory
authority in question upon the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. The CFTC is an
"independent agency." ld. at 836. Members of the legislative branch often regard independent agencies as creatures of Congress. Miller, Independent Agencies, I 986 SuP. CT. REV.
41, 63-64. From this perspective, Schor might indeed involve an attempt at congressional
aggrandizement of authority at the expense of another branch.
5
'Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 730. For a critical analysis of the assumption that the procedure
for removing the Comptroller General rendered that official subservient to Congress, see
Entin, supfa note 15, at 759-62.
58
1n Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline, 490 U.S. 212 (1989), the executive branch gained
the power to impose user fees that otherwise would have rested with Congress. In Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 36I (1989), the judicial branch received the power to determine
the permissible range of criminal sentences, authority that otherwise belonged to Congress.
In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), the judicial branch obtained authority over law
enforcement that otherwise would have been exercised by the executive. Even if characterized as congressional giveaways rather than executive or judicial usurpations, the arrangements in these two cases changed the interbranch balance of power. The provision in GrammRudman-Hollings authorizing Congress alone to prevent sequestration from occurring makes
it difficult to maintain that the magnitude of the reallocation of power in Bowsher exceeded
that in any of the cases discussed in this footnote.
59
E.g., Krent, supra note 52, at 1256-58, 1273-98.
'"E.g., Strauss, supra note 52, at 5I7-2I; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 495-96.
55

56
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are problematic. For example, some do not in fact account for the outcome
of all of the recent separation of powers cases. 5 1 Moreover, formalism, as
Bowsher demonstrates, can attach enormous legal weight to factors that have
little actual significance. By contrast, functionalism can yield such divergent
conclusions that even its adherents caution against the possibility of "conscious or unconscious manipulation. " 62 Thus, this approach may be "more
effective as a means of organizing debate than as a rule for deciding cases. " 63
The difficulty of reconciling the cases arises less from the idiosyncrasies
or intellectual deficiencies of judges than from the intractable nature of the
subject. 5 4 No unitary approach to this subject can take account of its logical
and empirical complexities. The unsatisfactory judicial performance and the
inadequacies of existing theories also suggest that Dean Choper might have
had a more valuable insight than he.has received credit for when he urged
the Supreme Court to refrain from deciding separation of powers disputes
between Congress and the President; such disputes would be resolved
through bargaining and accommodation between the political branches. 65
To the extent that his proposal rests upon the notion that judicial decisions
in this field squander limited institutional capital that should be saved for
more urgent individual rights cases, 66 it has received justifiable criticism _57
On the other hand, this proposal has the virtue of forcing us to confront
the limitations as well as the benefits of judicial review in a field where
"'Professor Krent, a formalist, and Professor Pierce, a functionalist, both found the Sentencing Commission unconstitutional under their theories. Krent, supra note 52, at 131116; Pierce, Morrison v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Government, 1988 SuP.
CT. REv. 1, 36. The Court, on the other hand, upheld the validity of the Sentencing Commission in Mistretta. Professor Pierce sought to avoid the implications of his theory by treating
the placement of the Commission in the judicial branch as a slip of the legislative pen. Pierce,
supra, at 37.
62
Strauss, supra note 23, at 617. A critic of this approach charges that functionalism serves
as "a shield behind which courts could rationalize their decisions to restructure governmental
arrangements, but it does not provide them with useful criteria as to when and in what
circumstances that restructuring is needed." Gifford, The Separation of Powers Doctrine and
the Regulatory Agencies After Bowsher v. Synar, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 441, 479 (1987).
The indeterminacy of functionalism is illustrated by the Bowsher case. Justice White demonstrated in detail that the procedure for removing the Comptroller General, which served
as the centerpiece of the Court's opinion, posed no real threat of congressional usurpation
of executive authority. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 770-75 (1986) (White,]., dissenting).
Professor Strauss, probably the leading academic functionalist, criticized justice White's analysis for failing to look beyond the removal procedure to "the general framework of relationships among the GAO, Congress, President, and courts." Strauss, supra note 52, at 520;
see id. at 498-99, 519-21.
"'Strauss, supra note 23, at 625 (footnote omitted).
64
See Bradley, The Uncertainty Principle in the Supreme Court, 1986 DUKE L.J. 1, 27-28;
Easterbrook, Ways of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REV. 802, 805-07 (1982).
65
CHOPER, supra note 22, at 263; see id. at 260-379.
60 ld. at 131-40, 156-70.
67
Dean Choper offered no persuasive evidence that public reaction to rulings upholding
individual liberties has been affected in any way by the results in separation of powers cases.
See Merritt, supra note 24, at 17 n.101 (collecting criticisms of this aspect of Choper's reasoning).
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principled decisions are difficult to construct and so basic a question as the
proper method of analysis remains unpredictable. The suggestion ofjudicial
deference or abstention in separation of powers disputes has elicited concerns that one branch might use its short-term bargaining advantage to
effect permanent and deleterious changes in the relative allocation of powers. 58 These concerns are legitimate, but they should not be exaggerated.
As noted in the introduction to this article, the judiciary has played no role
or only a marginal one in many important conflicts between Congress and
the President, including those involving the Tenure of Office Act, the War
Powers Resolution, and Watergate.
These considerations do not necessarily establish the mgency of Dean
Choper's proposal. The original structure of the Federal Election Commission, which was invalidated in Buckley v. Valeo 69 for violating the appointments clause, shows that Congress and the President, left to their own devices,
might agree to arrangements that contradict the allocation of authority expressly provided in the text of the Constitution. 70 That prospect suggests
the need for some judicial role in separation of powers disputes. The experiences with the Tenure of Office Act, the War Powers Resolution, and
Watergate should remind us, however, that the political branches have their
own resources and responsibilities in this field. That ~in turn counsels against
excessive reliance upon the judiciary as the ultimate arbiter of legislativeexecutive controversies. The Supreme Court itself recently cautioned against
gratuitous judicial resolution of such a constitutional turf battle. 71 Parts III
and IV examine the reasons for this caution.
III. THE POLITICAL BRANCHES AND
SEPARATION OF POWERS DISPUTES
Enthusiasts of judicial resolution of separation of powers disputes between
the political branches reason from two essential premises. One is that the
political branches are unqualified to interpret the Constitution. The other
is that interbranch differences pose unacceptable risks to the quality of public policy. Both of these premises are misleading at best.
The assumption that only the judiciary can resolve constitutional disputes
between Congress and the President has at least two unfortunate consequences. First, elected officials might refrain from evaluating the constitu"See, e.g., Gifford, supra note 62, at 44 7-48; Sunstein, supra note 3, at 494-95.

"424 U.S. 1, 109-43 (1976) (per curiam).
'"This concern recently led a lower court to invalidate the method for appointing the
first head of the agency charged with implementing reforms in the savings-and-loan industry.
That court explained that "[t]he President and the Congress, whether alone or together,
cannot decide to circumvent the Constitution's requirements." Olympic Fed. Savings & Loan
Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift Supervision, 732 F. Supp. 1183, 1193 n.9 (D.D.C.), appeal
dismissed, 903 F.2d 837 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
"American Foreign Serv. Ass'n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153, 161 (1989).
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tionality of practices or proposals that come before them for consideration.
Second, legislators and chief executives might seek to disguise their opposition to the wisdom of such practices or proposals by structuring them so
as to leave them vulnerable to lawsuits challenging their constitutionality.
These avoidance and camouflage techniques might insulate politicians from
the discomfort associated with making hard choices, but they also debase
the quality of deliberation about public policy.
These are not purely hypothetical concerns. As to the first, several members of the House Judiciary Committee voted against the article charging
President Nixon with committing impeachable offenses by defying congressional subpoenas on the ground that only the courts could determine the
validity of the subpoenas. 72 As to the second, the Democratic leadership of
the House of Representatives, which opposed the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act, supported specific provisions that they believed would make a constitutional challenge to the statute more likely to succeed. 73
The abhorrence of interbranch conflict also reflects a very different view
of the process of government than the one embodied in the Constitution.
The framers constructed an elaborate set of checks and balances to structure
the relationship between the political branches. Adherence to these ground
rules was expected to prevent overreaching by one branch and to discourage
the enactment of unsound proposals. Excessive reliance upon the judiciary
to resolve legislative-executive turf battles threatens to undermine the benefits of this scheme. This prospect should be troublesome to all citizens,
regardless of their general views about originalism in constitutional interpretation.
A. Constitutional Interpretation by the
Political Branches
The Supreme Court determined at an early date that the judicial branch
has the duty "to say what the law is." 74 This statement has served as the
72 H.R. REP. No. 1305, 93d Con g., 2d Sess. 360-61, 485-87 (I 974) (minority views); id. at
504-0S (additional views of Mr. Railsback); id. at 507-08 (additional views of Mr. Dennis); id.
at 520-23 (additional views of Mr. Froehlich in opposition to article III); Debate on Articles of
Impeachment: Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 4SS-S6
(I 974) (remarks of Rep. Froehlich); id. at 469-70 (remarks of Rep. Smith); id. at 4 73, 474
(remarks of Rep. Railsback).
"'Ellwood, The Politics of the Enactment and Implementation of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings: Why
Congress Cannot Address the Deficit Dilemma, 25 HARV.]. ON LEGIS. 553, 564 (I 988). Among
these must have been the assignment of authority to implement automatic spending reductions to the Comptroller General, an official subject to unilateral removal by Congress in
apparent violation of the teaching of Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (I 926). See E.
CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT'S REMOVAL POWER UNDER THE CONSTITUTION iii-iv (I 927); L.
jAFFE & N. NATHANSON, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 162 (4th ed.
I 976); Note, The Comptroller General of the United States: The Broad Power To Settle and Adjust
All Claims and Accounts, 70 HARV. L. REV. 350, 351 n.I2 (1956). This was, of course, the
basis for the holding in Bowsher.
'"Marbury v. Madison, S U.S. (I Cra~ch) 137,177 (1803).

44

43 ADMINISTRATIVE LAW REVIEW 31

predicate for the view that the Court has ultimate, if not exclusive, authority
in constitutional interpretation. 75 For this reason, many observers regard
with trepidation any suggestion for restricting the role of the judiciary in
separation of powers disputes between Congress and the President. Yet the
status of the Supreme Court as sole expositor of the Constitution has not
been universally accepted. For example, Andrew Jackson refused to regard
the ruling in McCulloch v. Maryland 76 as having settled the constitutionality
of the Bank of the United States. In vetoing a bill to recharter the Bank,
Jackson v.rrote:
The Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided by
its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to
support the Constitution swears that he will support it as he understands it, and
not as it is understood by others .... The authority of the Supreme Court must
not, therefore, be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when
acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force
of their reasoning may deserve. 77

Abraham Lincoln made his opposition to the Dred Scott decision 78 an important part of his unsuccessful campaign for the Senate in 1858. 79 He later
broadened his attack on the ~~judicja] monopoly" theo1y of constltutiona]
interpretation. 80 In his first inaugural address, Lincoln explained:
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are
to be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be
binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while
they are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases
by all other departments of the Government. ... At the same time, the candid
citizen must confess that if the policy of the Government upon vital questions
affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme
Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions, the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that
"E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1,
18 (1958).
"17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
"2 A CO~IPILATION Of THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS Of THE PRESIDENTS. 1789-1897, at
576,582
Richardson ed. 1896) (hereinafter MESSAGES AND PM'ERS OF THE PRESIDENTS).
'"Dred Scoll v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
"For example, during the Lincoln-Douglas Debates, Lincoln accepted the Dred Scali
decision as conclusive of the rights of the parties to that case but explained that he would
"refus[e] to obey it as a political rule. If I were in Congress, and a vote should come up on
a question whether slavery should be prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred
Scott decision, I would vote that it should." 2 THE COLLECTED WORKS Of ABRAHAM LINCOLN
495 (R. Basler ed. 1953). 1n a subsequent debate, Lincoln added that he opposed Dred Scott
"as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to vote for nobody who thinks it
wrong, which shall be binding on the members of Congress or the President to favor no
measure that does not actually concur with the principles of that decision." 3 id. at 255.
""This term is used in Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 97, 100 & n.5 (1988) (citing D. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION 89-96
(1966)).
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extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that eminent
tribunal. 81
Similar views were expressed both before and after these statements.
Thomas jefferson pardoned those convicted under the Sedition Act of 1798 82
despite judicial rulings upholding the constitutionality of the statute. 83 More
recently, President Franklin D. Roosevelt vigorously attacked Supreme Court
rulings invalidating important aspects of his legislative agenda. 84 During the
Watergate investigation, President Nixon implied that he might disregard
a Supreme Court directive to comply with the special prosecutor's subpoena
unless that ruling was "definitive. " 85 Finally, former Attorney General Edwin Meese kindled fierce debate with a speech asserting that "constitutional
interpretation is not the business of the Court only, but also properly the
business of all branches of government." 86
Perhaps these examples can be discounted as the sour grapes of those
whose positions the Supreme Court rejected. Nevertheless, other powerful
considerations support an independent role for the political branches in
constitutional interpretation in separation of powers disputes between Congress and the President. At the most basic level, elected officials must take
an oath to uphold the Constitution. 87 Faithfulness to their oath necessarily
requires members of Congress and the President to consider the constitu6 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS, supra note 77, at 5, 9.
Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (expired 1801).
"'As Jefferson explained in 1804 in a letter to Abigail Adams:
[Nlothing in the Constitution has given [the judges] a right to decide for the executive,
more than to the executive to decide for them. Both magistrates are equally independent
in the sphere of action assigned to them .... [The Constitution J meant that its coordinate
branches should be checks on each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the
right to decide what laws are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in
their own sphere of action, but for the Legislature and executive also, in their spheres,
would make the judiciary a despotic branch.
4 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 560, 561 (H. Washington ed. 1854).
84 G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 24 (11th ed. 1985). The judicial hostility to Roosevelt's program led to the ill-fated Court-packing plan. L. FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES 209-15 (1988); Leuchtenburg, The Case of the Contentious Commissioner: Humphreys'
(sic) Executor v. U.S., in FREEDOM AND REFORM 276, 310-11 (H. Hyman & L. Levy eds.
1967).
85 E. DREW, WASHINGTON JOURNAL 5, 45, 283, 304-05, 328 (1975). One of President
Nixon's advisors was widely quoted as saying: "We're leading ourselves into believing the
Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter of,all disputes, and I don't believe it. I think there are
times when the President of the United States would be right in not obeying a decision of
the Supreme Court." Id. at 21.
86 Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 985 (1987). For a compilation
of popular and academic responses to this speech, see Perspectives on the Authoritativeness of
Supreme Court Decisions, 61 TUL. L. REV. 977-1095 (1987).
In an earlier and less publicized episode, Mr. Meese suggested that the executive branch
might not deem itself bound by an adverse judicial ruling in a separation of powers dispute.
Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d 875, 889-90 (3d Cir.), on
reh'g, 809 F.2d 979,991-92 n.8 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988).
87 The presidential oath is prescribed in U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 7. The requirement
that members of Congress (as well as federal judges and all state officials) pledge to "support
this Constitution" appears in id. art. VI, cl. 3.
81

82
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tionality of proposed policies as an important aspect of performing their
duties. 88
Beyond the implications of the oath requirement, the Constitution imposes affirmative obligations upon elected officials. Several provisions specifically proscribe certain kinds of Iegislation, 89 and a number expressly
authorize the passage of implementing statutes. 90 Moreover, the Supreme
Court itself has held that Congress is not strictly bound by judicial interpretations of equal protection in enforcing the fourteenth amendment through
legislation. 91 ~A.Lccordingly, the political branches cannot escape the necessity
of assessing the constitutionality of at least some policy proposals.
In addition, the judiciary cannot resolve every constitutional issue. Article
Ill restricts the jurisdiction of the federal courts to cases and controversies. 92
Hence, the judicial branch cannot provide advisory opinions to Congress
and the President on the constitutionality of a proposed bill or program. 93
Correlatively, only those with standing to sue may challenge the constitutionality of government policies. If too many persons are affected by a particular policy, no private party will have standing to litigate a generalized
grievance. 9 -1 Even if that obstacle is surmounted, other barriers to standing
00
FISHEH, supm note 84, at 233-34; Bessette & Tulis, The Constitution, Politics, and the
Presidency, in THE PRESIDENCY iN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 3, ] ] Q. Bessette & j. Tulis
eds. 1981); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 585, 587 (I975); Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Pmtection, 72 MINN. L. REV.
311,313-14 (1987).
"''E.g.. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (prohibiting, inter alia, bills of attainder, ex post facto laws,
expenditures not authorized by a duly enacted appropriations statute, and titles of nobility,
and limiting the grounds for suspending habeas corpus); id. amend. I (prohibiting laws that
establish religion or abridge freedom of religion, speech, press, and assembly); id. amend. V
(prohibiting, inter alia, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, deprivation without due process
of life, liberty, or property, and uncompensated takings of private property).
00
E.g., id. amend. XIII, § 2; id. amend. XIV, § 5; id. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. XIX, §
2; id. amend. XXIII,§ 2; id. amend. XXIV,§ 2; id. amend. XXVI,§ 2.
"'The leading case is Katzen bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966). For discussion of the
role of the legislative branch in interpreting the fourteenth amendment, see L TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 5-14, at 334-50 (2d ed. 1988); Burt, Miranda and Title
II: !l Morganatic Marriage, I969 Sur. CT. REV. 81; Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Ross, supra note 88.
"'U.S. CONST. art. 1Il, § 2, cl. 1.
"' Some state courts do have the authority to issue advisory opinions. A prominent example is Massachusetts, where Governor Michael Dukakis's decision to veto a mandatory
nag-salute law in response to the advice of his state's highest court, Opinion of the Justices
to the Governor, 372 Mass. 874, 363 N .E.2d 251 (1977), became an unusually salient issue
in the 1988 presidential campaign. See generally j _GERMOND &j. WITCOVER, WHOSE BROAD
STRIPES AND BRIGHT STARS? 7-8, 160, 359, 460 (1989); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW
YORKER, Oct. ] 0, 1988, at 96, 96-97.
94
See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church
& State, Inc, 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
u.s. 208 (1974).
The standing of members of Congress to litigate the validity of governmental activities
remains unsettled. The Supreme Court expressly declined to address that issue in Bowsher
v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721 (1986), and avoided the merits in a subsequent case in which
the question was squarely presented. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987). Most of the
jurisprudence on this question has arisen in the United States Court of Appeals for the
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might well prevent the litigation of an appreciable number of separation of
powers disputes. 95 Moreover, the Court has various devices to avoid deciding the merits of cases over which it does have jurisdiction. 95 In each of
these situations, the absence of judicial resolution of the merits effectively
requires members of Congress and the President to determine the constitutionality of governmental activities for themselves.
Finally, as a practical matter, Congress and the President already interpret
the Constitution. That document fixes important political understandings
that typically go unremarked because of their broad acceptance. For example, no controversy exists over the eligibility standards or the duration
of terms for federal elected officials. Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and
Ronald Reagan did not seek third terms because all concerned understood
that the twenty-second amendment precluded them from doing so; Edward
Kennedy did not seek his brother John's Senate seat in 1961 because article
I made clear that a twenty-nine-year-old, no matter how prominent or wellDistrict of Columbia Circuit, which has recognized congressional standing in some cases. See,
e.g., Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985), vacated as moot sub nom. Burke v. Barnes,
479 U.S. 361 (1987); Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The concept of
congressional standing has been controversial even in that court. See, e.g., Barnes, 759 F.2d
at 43-56 (Bork, J ., dissenting); Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d
946, 957-61 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., concurring), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
At the same time, the D.C. Circuit has limited congressional access to judicial relief under
a doctrine known as "equitable discretion," which results in the dismissal of some cases in
which the congressional plaintiff is found to have standing and where no other devices for
avoiding the merits are available. See, e.g., Melcher v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d
561 (D.C. Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1042 (1988); Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983); Riegle v. Federal Open Mkt. Comm.,
656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082 (1981). This doctrine also has proved
controversial. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211, 214 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Melcher v.
Federal Open Mkt. Comm., 836 F.2d at 565 n.4; id. at 565 (Edwards,]., concurring); Barnes,
759 F.2d at 59-61 (Bork, J., dissenting); Moore, 733 F.2d at 961-64 (Scalia, J., concurring).
For a comprehensive discussion, see No.te, Equitable Discretion to Dismiss Congressional-Plaintiff
Suits: A Reassessment, 40 CASE W. RES. "L. REV. 1075 (1990).
95
ln order to establish standing, a plaintiff must satisfy a three-prong test of injury in fact,
causation, and redressability. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (I 984); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464,472
(1982). The jurisprudence of standing has been notably erratic, but recent decisions have
adopted a markedly restrictive approach. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984); City
of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org.,
426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490(1975).
96
Among these avoidance techniques are the political question and ripeness doctrines.
The former holds that the issue in dispute is inappropriate for judicial resolution at any time,
whereas the latter views the controversy as prematurely presented to the courts.
The political question doctrine has been distinctly out of favor with the Supreme Court
in recent decades. See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 4 78 U.S. I 09, 121-27 (1986); INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 940-43 (1983); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692-97 (1974); Powell
v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486,·518-49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,217 (1962). But
see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, I 002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the
judgment); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. I, I 0-11 (1973). Lower courts have made greater
use of the doctrine during this period. See Mulhern, supra note 80, at 106-08 nn.25-31
(collecting cases).
The leading case on ripeness is Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967).
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connected, could not hold the position. Similarly, despite the struggle over
the legislative veto, no one questions that bills must satisfy the bicameralism
and presentation requirements to become laws, or that the Senate must
confirm ambassadors, federal judges, and other officers of the United
States. 97 Indeed, during Watergate, members of Congress from both parties
believed that President Nixon's defiance of a Supreme Court ruling in the
litigation over the White House tape recordings would both justify and assure his impeachment and removal from office, a conclusion for which no
judicia] precedent existed. 98 Thus, the question is not "\vhether the political
branches will interpret the Constitution but under what circumstances they
will rio so.
B. The Benefits of Interbranch
Constitutional Debate
The preceding section demonstrated that legislative and executive evaluation of the constitutional issues raised in separation of powers disputes
between Congress and the President is appropriate. This section further
suggests that such consideration is desirable. To be sure, independent constitutional interpretation by nonjudicial officials holds out the prospect of
disagreement between the political branches on fundamental issues. Although many modern commentators view interbranch conflict with distaste,99 the Constitution was designed to facilitate debate among elected
officials on importaJ!t public questions. This debate might lead to stalemate;
but it also could stimulate more thoughtful public policy. The latter prospect
suggests that Congress and the President should be discouraged from relying too much upon the judiciary as arbiter of separation of powers disputes
and encouraged to reach workable accommodations that do not coi1travene
the constitutional text.
As noted earlier, the framers of the Constitution recognized the possibility
that one branch would seek to encroach upon the power of another, thereby
jeopardizing the core value of freedom upon which the new government
rested. 100 To minimize this possibility, each branch was given sufficient power
and incentives to resist attempted usurpations. Because the framers feared
legislative aggrandizement, 101 they made Congress bicameral and gave the
President a qualified veto. At the same time, the unfortunate experience
"'See Bessette & Tulis, supra note 88, at 9-10; Schauer, Eas)' Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
399,414 (1985).
""See DREW, supra note 85, at 41, 43, 51, 283, 292; Bessette & Tulis, supra note 88, at 9.
'"'N. POLSBY, CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENCY 202 (4th ed. 1986). Professor Polsby is not
one of those commentators. See id.
"'"See supra notes 36-45 and accompanying text.
""Perhaps the most famous expression of this concern is Madison's observation that "'[i]n
republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." THE FEDERALIST
No. 51, supra note 36, at 322. Madison also complained that "[t]he legislative department is
everywhere extending the sphere of its activity and drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex." THE FEDERALIST No. 48, at 309 Q. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
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under the British made all concerned acutely aware of the dangers of unchecked executive power, which was "carefully limited" in article II. 102 Significantly, however, the Constitution did not explicitly define the respective
powers of each branch, and its supporters discounted the value of "parchment barriers" against overreaching. 103 Despite the availability of judicial
review, Congress and the President were expected to rely primarily upon
their own political self-defense mechanisms when interbranch disputes arose.
In short, the framers did not contemplate an active judicial role in separation of powers disputes. This crude originalism cannot end the discussion,
however. After all, the framers also created a system oflimited government.
A faithful adherent to the founding design might argue that the courts
should rigorously enforce the separation of powers to protect the core constitutional value of liberty. This argument takes on added strength in light
of the vastly increased scale of federal activities compared with the role of
the central government envisioned in the last decades of the eighteenth
century.
Two responses to this claim are available. First, the Supreme Court in
recent years has tried to give effect to the founding design. As Part II of
this article seeks to demonstrate, the results of this enterprise have been
unsatisfactory. An originalist might rejoin that these difficulties have arisen
from the Court's failure to apply a strict separation principle with sufficient
consistency. That point leads directly into the second response to the originalist position: the framers lacked a detailed vision of the institutional implications of the separation of powers doctrine and did not contemplate a
regime of rigid formality in this field. 104 The absence of such a vision might
help to explain the difficulties of the recent judicial opinions on this subject.
Because the Constitution does not yidd conclusive answers to these questions and because Congress and the President have both the resources and
the incentive to defend their positions, disputes of this kind are appropriately addressed primarily in the political arena.
At bottom, these disputes involve questions about the role of government
in American life. In general, those who advocate strict maintenance of interbranch boundaries believe in a comparatively limited federal role. Although the Supreme Court has dealt with the subject only obliquely, 105 several
commentators have recognized the political implications of these conflicts.
Rigid demarcation between the executive and legislative branches, accordFEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 101, at 309. See also EPSTEIN, supra note 37, at 132.
FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 101, at 308-09.
104 GWYN, supra note 27, at 128; Casper, An Essay in Separation of Powers: Some Early Versions
and Practices, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211,212,224,239-42,260-61 (1989); Shane, Independent Policymaking and Presidential Power: A Constitutional Analysis, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
102 THE
103 THE

596,616-17 (1989).
105
See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,722 (1986) (separation of powers "provide[s] avenues
for the operation of checks on the exercise of governmental power"); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919,959 (1983) (separation of powers operates to "define and limit the exercise of. ..
federal powers").
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ing to this view, would make it more difficult for the federal government
to act. A strong delegation doctrine would force Congress to make hard
policy choices about contentious subjects; the more specific the statute must
be, the greater the possibility that opponents could defeat it. The absence
of the legislative veto would discourage Congress from authorizing agencies
to promulgate regulations that could be overturned only through the regular legislative process with all its complexities and pitfalls. And giving the
President unfettered removal authority and absolute control over all officials exercising executive power would make Congress less willing to permit
agencies from which the legislature would be effectively insulated. 106 The
political compromises leading to the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission and the Federal Trade Commission suggest that this view is
not entirely implausible. 107
Whether or not rigorous adherence to separation of powers principles
would reduce the federal role, 108 powerful legal arguments exist for a more
permissive constitutional analysis in this field. Among them are the flexibility inherent in a Constitution that does not rigidly define the authority of
the legislative and executive branches, the apparent pragmatism of the framers in addressing problems of administration, the wide (though not unlimited) latitude afforded to Congress under the necessary and proper clause
to structure the government, and the twentieth-century breakdown of what-

10
'See, e.g., R. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS I6-I7 (I985); Aranson, Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of
Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REV. I, 63-64 (I982); Epstein, Self-Interest and the Constitution, 37]. LEGAL Enuc. I 53, I 56 (I987); Gellhorn, Returning to First Principles, 36 AM.
U.L. REv. 345, 349 (I987).
107
See R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS I77-87 (194I) (ICC);
S. SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE I38-50 (I982) (FTC).
108
It is difficult to assess the accuracy of this hypothesis. In Chadha, the Supreme Court
held that statutes containing unconstitutional legislative vetoes could remain in force if the
objectionable veto provisions were severable. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 93I-32. The Court endorsed a severability criterion that would uphold a partially unconstitutional statute "[u]nless
it is evident that the Legislature would not have enacted those provisions which are within
its power, independently of that which is not." Champlin Ref. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
286 u.s. 2IO, 234 (I932).
Applying that standard reveals the difficulty of predicting what Congress would do under
a stricter separation of powers regime. The Chadha majority found the legislative veto provision severable from the remainder of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Chadha, 462
U.S. at 932-35.Justice Rehnquist, after examining the identical historical record, found that
it was not. I d. at I 0 I3-I6 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Similarly, the Court summarily affirmed
a finding of severability in one of Chadha's companion cases despite strong indications that
the measure in question would not have been enacted without the veto. See Consumer Energy
Council of Am. v. FERC, 673 F.2d 425, 440-45 (D.C. Cir. I982), ajj'd mem. sub nom. Process
Gas Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council of Am., 463 U.S. I2I6 (I983). The
evidence to the contrary included protracted congressional consideration of the statute,
which passed the House by only one vote after its proponents emphasized the availability of
legislative vetoes of objectionable agency rules. See Miller, supra note 56, at 89-90 n.I75;
Strauss, Legislative Theory and the Rule of Law: Some Comments on Rubin, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
427,447 (I989).
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ever earlier consensus had existed in favor of strictly limited government. 109
Wide public support remains for an enlarged federal role, as the contemporary difficulty of reducing the budget deficit attests. 110 In these circumstances, a sustained effort to invalidate government programs on separation
of powers grounds could threaten a political crisis comparable to the one
that arose from the Supreme Court's overturning many of the early New
Deal reforms. 111
The optimum solution to this conflict is for partisans of the competing
approaches to argue over their political disagreements in political settings.
This solution has several advantages over reliance upon the courts. First,
the difficulties of producing consistent, principled answers to these problems suggests that the concept of separation of powers provides less a rule
of decision than a heuristic concept for structuring analysis. 112 Second, interbranch negotiation rather than judicial determination acknowledges the
political contingencies involved in many separation of powers disputes. As
noted above, supporters of a strong doctrine in this field traditionally have
also endorsed limited government. For that reason, advocates of a more
activist state generally have denigrated the separation principle as an anachronism at best and an obstacle to essential reforms at worst. 113 This pattern
has not always existed, however. For example, in the 1970's the principal
proponents of legislative authority as a means of recapturing the proper
interbranch allocation of power supported a greater federal role; the defenders of expansive presidential prerogatives favored a smaller central gov-

' 0 'Perhaps the leading academic advocates of this perspective have been Professors Strauss
and Sunstein. See, e,g., Strauss, supra note 23; Sunstein, supra note 3. On the necessary and
proper clause, see Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the
President and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of the Sweeping Clause,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring I976, at I 02.
110
See R. EISNER, How REAL IS THE FEDERAL DEFICIT? I60-6I (I986); D. STOCKMAN, THE
TRIUMPH OF POLITICS 8-9, 376-77,390-92 (I986).
"'Political prediction is a notoriously risky affair. Nevertheless, the intense opposition to
the failed Supreme Court nomination of Robert Bark, which reflected concern over the
threat of significant changes in constitutional law, suggests that a separation of powers jurisprudence which invalidated many environmental, health, and safety programs would stimulate widespread controversy. Even Professor Epstein, a leading academic proponent of
limited government, recognizes the difficulty of wholesale judicial reversal of objectionable
legal doctrine. EPSTEIN, supra note I 06, at 306-07, 329; Epstein, The Proper Scope of the
Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. I387, I387, 1454-55 (I987).
'"See Kurland, The Rise and Fall of the "Doctrine" of Separation of Powers, 85 MICH. L. REV.
592,602 (1986).
113
For modern expositions of this view, see, e.g.,]. BURNS, THE DEADLOCK OF DEMOCRACY
(I963); Cutler, To Form a Government, 59 FoREIGN AFF. I26 (I980). Similar conceptions
undergirded the Progressive critique of American politics developed most conspicuously by
Woodrow Wilson. See Tuus, supra note 4I, at II9-24; see also Mahoney, A Newer Science of
Politics: The Federalist and American Political Science in the Progressive Era, in SAVING THE
REVOLUTION 250, 251-61 (C. Kesler ed. I987).
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ernment. 114 Moreover, the leading separation of powers cases in recent years
have been advanced not by advocates of smaller government but by champions of a more aggressive federal role. The challenges to the constitutionc
ality of the legislative veto in Chadha, the deficit-reduction mechanism of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings in Bowsher, and the Sentencing Commission in
Mistretta v. United States 115 were brought by advocates of more vigorous
government regulation. These proponents of a more activist state believe
that strict adherence to separation of powers principles will reduce the influence of industry, trade, and other special interests and thereby facilitate
the development and implementation of effective programs to protect public health and safety. 116 Thus, committed advocates of contrasting substantive political visions might find it advantageous not to have separation of
powers disputes resolved by the courts because short-term judicial victories
for one side might have sobering longer-term implications when the other
side controls the government. 11 7
Third, and most significant, reliance upon the political process to resolve
most separation of powers disputes recognizes that an effective government
requires a degree of interbranch comity that is inconsistent with frequent
resort to the judicial process. Despite the importance of "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open" debate on public issues, 118 our system rests upon unexpressed understandings and an uncodified but shared sense of limits. 119
Understandings are unexpressed and the sense of limits is shared but uncodified because participants in the political process recognize the need to
avoid open warfare and because both structural and institutional factors
dampen the inevitable conflicts that do arise. 120
Judicial opinions, on the other hand, raise the stakes of any particular
conflict by clearly identifying winners and losers through formal explana1
"Several statutes passed during this period exemplify Congress's efforts to reassert its
powers. See, e.g., Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No.
93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C. (1988)); War
Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 15411548 (1988)).
115 488 u.s. 361 (1989).
116
AII three of these cases were argued in the Supreme Court by Alan Morrison, director
of litigation at Public Citizen, Inc., a public interest organization founded by Ralph Nader
that favors more vigorous government regulation. B. CRAIG, CHADHA 61-65 (1988); Elliott,
Regulating the Deficit After Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 31 7, 319 n.l2 ( 198 7).
'"For example, a conservative journalist warned that admirers of Ronald Reagan who
advocate a strong presidency as a bulwark against intrusive actions by an unsympathetic
Congress should consider the implications of giving similar powers to a liberal chief executive
when political fashions change. Francis, Imperial Conservatives?, NAT'L REV., Aug. 4, 1989,
at 37.
'"New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
9
" See, e.g., DREW, supra note 85, at 9; Levi, Some Aspects of Separation of Powers, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 371, 391 (1976). This is a lesson that some notably unsuccessful recent Presidents,
especially Richard Nixon and Jimmy Carter, failed to learn. POLSBY, supra note 99, at 45,
49-50, 66.
120
See POLSBY, supra note 99, at 206-09.
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tions that presumably will control other analytically related disputes. 121 The
prospect oflitigation creates incentives to assert maximum positions for shortterm advantage in court and to characterize opposing views as illegitimate.122 In situations where the Constitution provides no determinative answer, Congress and the President would do better to seek to resolve their
separation of powers disputes by negotiating them in good faith than to
depend upon the judiciary as other than a last resort. Negotiated resolutions
of specific disagreements can decide smaller questions in ways that create a
foundation for similarly informal arrangements of future interbranch differences while recognizing the contrasting interests of the governmental
institutions involved. 123
Some might object to this approach on the ground that it will undermine
the rule of law by facilitating interbranch power grabs. Yet our political
history teaches that "an excessive force in one direction is apt to produce a
corresponding counterforce." 124 This is the lesson not only of the controversies over the Tenure of Office Act and of Watergate, but also of most
of our political history. Overreaching by one of the political branches typically begets reassertion by the other. 125 To be sure, the relative powers of
Congress and the President would change over time if interbranch disputes
were generally negotiated rather than litigated, 126 but the relative powers
of the political branches have changed dramatically anyway.
Consider the legislative veto and the role of the Comptroller General in
implementing Gramm-Rudman-Hollings under the approach advocated
here. As to the former, the legislative veto often was the price that Presi121
R. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES 18-22 (1989). Professor Nagel probably would
not agree with the suggestion that separation of powers disputes are generally better handled
outside the judicial system. See Nagel, A Comment on the Rule of Law Model of Separation of
Powers, 30 WM. & MARY L. REV. 355, 360-62 (1989) (criticizing functionalist arguments
supporting the result in Morrison); but see id. at 363-64 (warning against the dangers of
"[ d]octrinaire enforcement of the theory of separation of powers").
122
NAGEL, supra note 121, at 21; Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government
of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461, 46465,492, 501-14 (1987).
"' The procedural details for accomplishing interbranch negotiations are beyond the
scope of this article. For a suggested framework for handling executive privilege disputes,
see Shane, supra note 122, at 516-40.
'"Freund, The Supreme Court, 1973 Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L
REV.l3,20(1974).
125
Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 519, 532 (1987); Karl, Executive Reorganization and Presidential Power, 1977 Sur. CT. REV. 1, 34; Pierce, Political Accountability and
Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U.L. REV. 391, 405-06 (1987).
Indeed, the reassertion itself may represent an alternative form of overreaching in the
absence of the necessary interbranch comity. For example, Congress became enamored of
the legislative veto as a means for controlling substantive administrative rules during the
Nixon administration, when the relationship between the legislative and executive branches
was especially bitter. Approximately eighty percent of the more than two hundred bills
containing legislative vetoes enacted between 1950 and 1976 were approved from 1970
onward. PoLSBY, supra note 99, at 237 n.l22 (citing Cooper & Hurley, The Legislative Veto:
A Policy Analysis, 10 CONG. & PRESIDENCY 1 (1983)).
126
See NAGEL, supra note 121, at 22.
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dents paid for obtaining broad delegations to undertake important initiatives for which a statutory basis did not already exist. Congress, protective
of its institutional prerogatives even when it sympathized with presidential
goals, often inserted legislative veto provisions into bills that gave the executive branch the requested substantive authority.I2 7 Because the text of
the Constitution does not specify that a legislative veto is subject to the
bicameralism and presentation requirements, 128 courts generally would uphold such accommodations. 129 In the event of disagreement between Congress and the President, the political branches would have to determine the
stakes for themselves. Congress could refuse to give the executive authority
to act without a legislative veto, the President could disapprove a bill containing such a veto, or the chief executive might accept some (but not all)
legislative veto provisions. Resolution of these differences might vary depending upon the centrality of the substantive initiative to the political program of the President and members of Congress or upon the form of the
particular legislative veto at issue (two-house, one-house, or committee).
As to the latter, the procedure for removing the Comptroller General
received almost no attention during the debate over Gramm-RudmanHollings.130 That procedure was, however, the subject of intense interbranch contention when the position was created shortly after World War
I. President Wilson vetoed an important bill that was designed to reform
the federal budget because he regarded a provision authorizing the removal
127See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968-74 (1983) (White, J., dissenting); FISHER, supra
note 42, at 164-70; Fisher, Congress and the President in the Administrative Process: The Uneasy
Alliance, in THE ILLUSION OF PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 21, 26-28 (H. Hecla & L. Salamon
eds. 1981); Karl, supra note 125, at 3-7; Nathanson, Separation of Powers and Administrative
Law: Delegation, the Legislative Veto, and the "Independent" Agencies, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 1064,
1088-89 & n.74 (1981). See generally CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV. FOR THE SUBCOMM.
ON RULES OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON RULES, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., STUDIES ON THE LEGISLATIVE VETO (Comm. Print 1980).
'"Chadha, 462 U.S. at 981-82 (White, J ., dissenting).
"'Courts would still invalidate particular legislative veto provisions that allowed Congress
to make typically judicial decisions when legislative procedures did not afford due process to
the targets ofsuch decisions. Some have suggested that the statute at issue in Chadha had
this infirmity. See, e.g., id. at 964-65 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment). This approach
to Chadha is not free from difficulty, however. Before the procedure at issue in that case was
adopted, the legislative branch resolved deportation disputes through private bills. !d. at 954.
Moreover, Congress has express power to regulate immigration. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.
4. Finally, one of Madison's statements in the Constitutional Convention strongly implies his
belief that the legislature had power over individual naturalization cases. 2 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 236 (M. Farrand rev. ed. 1937) (opposing a
proposal to require Senators to have been citizens for at least 14 years "because it will put
it out of the power of the Nat[iona]l Legislature even by special acts of naturalization to
confer the full rank of Citizens on meritorious strangers").
'"President Reagan emphasized the removal question in his signing statement. Statement
on Signing the Bill Increasing the Public Debt Limit and Enacting the Balanced Budget and Emergency
Deficit Control Act of 1985, PuB. PAPERS 1471, 1471-72 (1985). No mention of that subject
occurred in the congressional debates. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 783 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). That omission might have been deliberate. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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of the Comptroller by concurrent resolution as an incursion upon executive
prerogatives; Congress and his successor, President Harding, negotiated a
compromise providing for removal by joint resolution. 131 In light of the
silence of the Constitution on the removal issue and the limited empirical
significance of the power to remove federal officers, 132 the judiciary should
respect this not necessarily ideal interbranch accommodation. 133
A more fundamental objection to the role of the Comptroller arises from
the process for appointing that official, a subject about which the Constitution is quite explicit but which has been almost completely ignored in
litigation. 134 The President is required to select the Comptroller from a list
of three nominees provided by the congressional leadership. 135 Because the
appointments clause does not give Congress authority to nominate officers
or inferior officers, the procedure for choosing the Comptroller might well
contravene the express terms of the Constitution. 136 Under the approach
131

132

See Entin, supra note 15, at 754-55.
See id. at 712-14, 777-81.

13 ' • CJ United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 694-95 n.8 (197 4) (finding no constitutional
infirmity in requirement that congressional leaders consent to removal of Watergate special
prosecutor even though that official exercised executive power).
Congress and the President recently reached a negotiated resolution of another controversy involving the role of the Comptroller General. Under the Competition in Contracting
Act, 31 U .S.C. § § 3551-3556 (1988), the Comptroller was authorized temporarily to stay the
award or implementation of government contracts that were subject to protests by disappointed bidders. The Comptroller cciuld investigate such protests but his disposition could
not bind the executive branch. Litigation over the constitutionality of the Act was ended
when Congress amended the statute to eliminate the provision that the executive branch
found most objectionable. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 787 F.2d
875 (3d Cir.), on reh'g, 809 F.2d 979 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. dismissed, 488 U.S. 918 (1988); see
Miller, supra note 10, at 418-21.
·
The history of Ameron could be taken to suggest that Congress and the President would
not have reached their accommodation without the uncertainty engendered by the pendency
of the lawsuit about the constitutionality of the Competition in Contracting Act. That is not
the only plausible interpretation of this episode, however. Ameron arose after the executive
branch refused to enforce the Act, thereby precipitating a test case. The political branches
at all times regarded the dispute as a purely legal question. If a greater degree of interbranch
comity existed, the dispute never might have arisen or could have been treated as a subject
for genuine negotiation. I d. at 420; see supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
"·'The procedure for appointing the Comptroller was mentioned in passing but given no
substantive weight in Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 727-28 & n.6.
135
31 U.S.C. § 703(a)(2) (1988).
136See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126-35 (1976) (per curiam). The only legislative role
in the appointment process is the provision for Senate confirmation of officers of the United
States. U.S. CaNST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Congress may, of course, create positions and define
their terms and conditions, including the qualifications of federal officials. See, e.g., 15 U .S.C.
§ 41 (1988) (limiting partisan composition of Federal Trade Commission); 29 U .S.C. § 661 (a)
(1988) (requiring members of Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission to be
selected "from among persons who by reason of training, education, or experience are
qualified"); 47 U.S.C. § 154(b)(2)(A) (1988) (disqualifying from membership on Federal
Communications Commission persons holding financial interests in entities subject to FCC
regulation). Such generic requirements do not significantly restrict the universe from which
the President may nominate. The procedure for selecting the Comptroller General, on the
other hand, allows the congressional leadership to limit the universe of potential comptrollers
to three persons.
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advocated in this article, the judiciary would focus upon how the Comptroller is hired rather than how he might be fired when assessing the validity
of legislation conferring authority upon that official.
To be sure, this approach would leave a residue of ambiguity about the
precise limits oflegislative and executive power. That residue exists anyway,
because the Supreme Court has failed to articulate a consistent methodology
in this field. Under the alternative proposed here, Congress and the President would fulfill their obligation independently to interpret the Constitution.137 Sometimes this process would result in deadlock, but the prospects
for reasonable accommodation might be enhanced if the political branches
knew that the judiciary would not. ordinarily rescue them from the consequences of their disagreements and that the outcome of one dispute would
not bind either side in subsequent conflicts.

IV. BRINGING POLITICAL JUDGMENT BACK IN:
THE NEED FOR WISDOM
Forbearing to litigate separation of powers disputes between Congress
and the President offers one final benefit. Because participants in such disputes would have less incentive to jockey for advantage in judicial proceedings, they might devote more attention to the wisdom of controversial
proposals. Courts determine only the constitutionality, not the soundness,
of a statute or practice. J3B Professor Nathanson reminded us that "the debate over ... desirability ... need not be conducted entirely on the constitutional level, and that a Supreme Court decision rejecting a constitutional
challenge should not be interpreted as a vindication of ... practical value
.... " 139 This reminder has particular relevance to the policy innovations
that gave rise to the recent separation of powers jurisprudence. Some of
those innovations, whatever their constitutionality, were of dubious wisdom.
That mundane point was frequently overlooked in the loftier legal and academic debate over Chadha, Bowsher, Monison, and other Supreme Court
cases.
Consider the legislative veto. That device quite properly has been criti""Institutional differences between the political branches and the courts might make the
quality of legislative-executive constitutional debate disappointing to aficionados of judicial
interpretation. See, e.g., Brest, Congress as Constitutional Decisiomnaker and Its Power to Counter
judicial Doctrine, 21 GA. L. REV. 57, 98-l 0! (1986); Mikva, How Well Does Congress Suppo,-t
and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L. REV. 587 (1983).
""See, e.g., Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,712 (1986); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348
U.S. 483,488 (!955); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398,447-48 (1934).
"'"Nathanson, supra note 127, at l 091. Professor Nathanson made this point in a discussion
of the legislative veto, but his suggestion apparently was too subtle for some readers who
characterized his reluctance to invalidate the veto as showing his "generally favorable" disposition toward its desirability. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 976 n.l2 (1983) (White, J.,
dissenting); Martin, The Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power, 68
VA. L. REV. 253, 255 n.5 (1982).
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cized for skewing the administrative process in subtle but potentially important ways. In particular, the legislative veto tends to bias the process
against regulation by giving members of Congress the opportunity to reject
a specific proposal without having to weigh alternatives, to confer advantages upon economically powerful trade and industry groups which have
the resources to oppose regulations both at the agency and on Capitol Hill,
to encourage broad delegations, and to increase the risk of political impasse
between regulators and legislators. 140 Whatever the constitutionality of the
veto, these characteristics provide potentially powerful arguments against
the desirability of the device as a means of controlling administrative discretion. Those arguments do not depend upon hypothetical comparisons
with other congressional mechanisms for preventing agency overreaching;
they address the wisdom of the legislative veto on its own terms. 141 Moreover, if the legislative veto were applied as broadly as many of its enthusiasts
proposed, Congress could quickly find itself overwhelmed by the task of
reviewing agency regulations. 142 Even if it is constitutional, then, the legislative veto is a bad idea that would create more problems than it would
solve.
Similarly, the abstract debate over the Comptroller General's alleged subservience to Congress diverted attention from the fundamental flaws of
Gramm-Rudman-Hollings as a means for reducing the budget deficit. At
the most basic level, the statute rests upon controversial economic assump-

140
See, e.g., Bruff, Legislative Formality, Administrative Rationality, 63 TEX. L. REV. 207, 22122 (1984); Bruff & Gellhorn, Congressional Control of Administrative Regulation: A Study of
Legislative Vetoes, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1369, 1381-82, 1409-20 (1977); Martin, supra note 139,
at 267-85.
141
The principal empirical study of the operation and effect of the legislative veto suggested
that the deleterious effects of the veto were greater than were those associated with other
forms of congressional oversight of the administrative process. Bruff & Gellhorn, supra note
140, at 1420-23. That study unfortunately failed to examine programs in which regulations
were not subject to legislative vetoes. It examined only the five programs which had provided
"[m]ost of the current federal experience with legislative veto of rulemaking." !d. at 1371.
The omission of any program in which substantive rules were not subject to legislative veto
prevents reliable inferences about the distinctive impact of the veto upon the programs that
were studied. See, e.g., D. CAMPBELL &j. STANLEY, EXPERIMENTAL AND QUASI-EXPERIMENTAL
DESIGNS FOR RESEARCH 6-7 (1963). The inability to compare the consequences of the veto
with those of other forms of congressional oversight does not preclude an assessment of the
impact of the veto on its own terms, ho-wever.
12
'· This daunting prospect played an important role in the defeat of bills that would have
created so-called generic legislative vetoes in the years before the Chadha decision. CRAIG,
supra note 116, at 49-50, 56-57.
At the same time, neither the Supreme Court's invalidation of the legislative veto in Chadha
nor the general undesirability of the device has prevented its reappearance in a large number
of statutes since 1983. Congress has enacted more than one hundred such provisions despite
the seemingly unambiguous judicial condemnation of the practice. Almost all of these new
vetoes appear in appropriations bills and give the power to disapprove proposed expenditures
to committees or even to subcommittees. Despite presidential objections, the executive branch
has acquiesced in these arrangements because they afford useful flexibility. L. FISHER, THE
POLITICS OF SHARED POWER 102-03 (2d ed. 1987); Strauss, supra note 108, at 447 n.63.
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tions concerning the adverse effects of deficits. HJ Even accepting the underlying premise that current budgetary shortfalls have reached unacceptable
levels, however, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings had numerous defects. First, it
contained no sanction if the federal government exceeded the annual deficit
limit; the statutory targets applied only to the projected deficit at the beginning of the fiscal year, not to the actual deficit at the end of the fiscal year. 1•1·1
More significant, nothing in the law required that the projected deficit be
based upon realistic economic assumptions or that the political branches
avoid the most blatant accounting gimmicks to keep from triggering the
sequestration process. Consequently, the measures taken to reduce the projected deficit frequently have strained credulity. 145 These were the real
problems presented by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings. The role of the Comptroller General was peripheral.
Finally, the litigation over the constitutionality of the independent counsel obscured other troublesome questions about the Ethics in Government
Act. First, by requiring an outside investigation of credible allegations of
criminal wrongdoing against high-level executive officials, the statute presumes that the professional staff of the Department of Justice is incapable
of dispassionately handling sensitive cases. To be sure, the Department performed inadequately during Watergate. HG Ironically, the Ethics Act, which
was passed to restore public confidence in government, subtly undermines
that goal by resting the independent counsel provision upon a presumption
of governmental incompetence. Perhaps this unintended consequence does
not outweigh the benefits of avoiding perceived conflicts of interest, but

,_, Gramm-Rudman-Hollings rests upon the notion that deficits are unmitigated evils.
Many economists, however, reject this concept and believe that a single-minded campaign
to reduce the deficit can do more harm than good. See, e.g., EISNER, supra note 110, at 16164; Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CALIF. L.
REV. 593, 638-39 (1988).
,.,.,Kuttner, The Fttdge Factor, NEW REPUBLIC, June 19, 1989, at 22, 23. Moreover, both
the original version of the statute and the 1987 revisions passed in response to the ruling in
Bowsher specifically limited the size of any automatic spending reductions for the fiscal year
during which those measures were enacted. Consequently, the deficit target for those years
was not attained. Stith, supra note 143, at 629-30.
'"Among the devices which have been used to bring projected deficits into compliance
with Gramm-Rudman-Hollings are postponing payments from the last day of one fiscal year
to the first clay of the following one, assuming higher rates of economic growth and lower
rates of inflation than predicted by reputable private forecasters, selling off government
assets, and removing items likely to contribute substantially to the deficit (such as the savingsand-loan relief program) "off budget" in whole or part. B. FRIEDMAN, DAY OF RECKONING
278-79 (1988); Domenici, The Gramm-Rudman-Hollings Budget Process: An Act in Legislative
Futility?, 25 l-lARV. J. ON LEGIS. 537, 540 (1988); Downey, The Futility of Gramm-RudmanHollings, 25 l-lARV. j. ON LEGIS. 545, 548-49 (1988); Drew, Letter from Washington, NEW
YORKER, May 15, 1989, at 87, 91; Friedman, A Deficit of Civic Courage, N.Y. REv. BoOKS,
June l, 1989, at 23, 26; Kuttner, supra note 144, at 22-23.
'"But seeS. KUTLER, THE WARS OF WATERGATE 335-36 (1990) (contending that Justice
Department lawyers performed creditably and had uncovered the essential facts before the
appointment of Archibald Cox as special prosecutor).
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that question apparently was lost in the constitutional rhetoric. 147 Second,
despite its name, the Ethics Act emphasizes criminality rather than ethical
impropriety. Accordingly, targets of investigations by independent counsel
routinely proclaim themselves vindicated if the counsel does not seek an
indictment. 148 Surely we should expect public officials to aspire to higher
standards of conduct than "Never Been Indicted." 149
V. CONCLUSION
The Constitution is more than "what the judges say it is." 150 That document provides the framework for our government and our politics. It is, in
short, an important part of our culture as well as of our law. 151 Accordingly,
the Constitution derives its meaning not only from judicial interpretation
but also from shared understandings that emerge from governance and politics. This fact suggests that not every dispute over the appropriate division
of authority between Congress and the President requires judicial resolution. Instead, the political branches themselves have resources and obligations to develop their own views and to fashion accommodations of their
sometimes conflicting interests. Moreover, just as the Constitution might
not apply in a determinative way to particular interbranch disputes, sometimes the wisdom of a proposed statute or policy is more important than its
constitutionality. Both politicians and citizens too often forget this mundane
point.
This view of the separation of powers assumes a minimum level of interbranch comity. The present political situation affords few grounds for optimism. For most of the past generation, we have had a divided federal
government, with one party controlling the legislative branch and the other
controlling the executive. In addition, sophisticated legal staffs seek vigi'"The independent counsel statute might be seen as the only way to prevent a recurrence
of the so-called Saturday Night Massacre, in which Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox was
dismissed for too vigorously pressing his investigation into the Watergate affair. Jd. at 58182. The real lesson of that episode, however, is not what happened to Mr. Cox, but rather
what happened to President Nixon. The national uproar that followed the Saturd<\)' Night
Massacre not only forced Mr. Nixon to acquiesce in the appointment of a new special prosecutor but also fueled widespread suspicion that he had something to hide, a suspicion that
fatally undermined his efforts to remain in office. DREW, supra note 85, at 112-13, 115-16,
148- 49; KUTLER, supra note 146, at406, 410-14, 619.
""Carter, supra note 50, at 139. Not only the targets of such investigations adopt this
rhetorical posture; Presidents do, too. See The President's News Conference, 24 WEEKLY
CaMP. PRES. Docs. 255, 258 (1988) ("no attention is paid to the fact of how many [targets
of independent counsel investigations], when it actually carne to trial, [were] found to be
totally innocent").
" 9 C. TRJLLIN, The Motto-Maker's Art, in IF You CAN'T SAY SOMETHING NICE II, 11-12,
14 (1987). See also Carter, supra note 50, at 139.
"°FISHER, supra note 84, at 245 (quoting ADDRESSES AND PAPERS OF CHARLES EVANS
HUGHES 139 (1908)).
'"SeeM. KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF 38I-400 (I 986); S. LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 9-53 (1988).
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lantly to safeguard each branch's constitutional prerogatives. 152 For these
and other reasons, pmverful incentives exist for conflict rather than cooperation.
Regardless of the current outlook, however, the approach suggested here
comports with the constitutional design for a government characterized by
both liberty and efficiency. The unlikelihood that this approach will be
adopted simply proves that the Constitution affords the necessary, but not
sufficient, conditions for such a government. 153

'"See Miller, supra note 10, at 412-26.
'"'See D. MOYNIHAN, The "New Science of Politics" and the Old Art of Governing, in
REVOLUTION 301, 307 (1988); Tuus, supra note 4 J, at 42.
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